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When	 confronting	 democratic	 backsliding	 in	 its	 member	 states,	 the	 European	 Union	 (EU)	 cannot	 rely	 on	
material	 sanctions.	 There	 are	 formidable	 obstacles	 to	 using	 the	 one	 political	 safeguard	 that	 entails	material	
sanctions,	namely	Article	7	of	the	Treaty	on	European	Union	(TEU).	Moreover,	the	experience	of	the	EU’s	pre-
accession	conditionality	suggests	 that	even	a	credible	 threat	of	material	 sanctions	 is	 least	effective	 the	more	
severe	 the	 breaches	 of	 liberal	 democracy.	 However,	 EU	 interventions	 without	 material	 leverage	 are	 not	
necessarily	doomed,	as	the	case	of	Romania	in	2012	shows.	Under	favourable	conditions	the	EU	can	thus	elicit	
governments	 to	 repeal	 illiberal	 practices	 by	 relying	 primarily	 on	 social	 pressure	 and	 persuasion.	 This	
contribution	 assesses	 to	 what	 extent	 novel	 instruments	 that	 EU	 institutions	 have	 developed	 to	 confront	













(Blauberger	and	Kelemen	2016)	 is	unlikely	as	 the	EU	member	 states	are	unwilling	 to	 cede	
any	 control	 over	 how	 to	 respond	 to	 such	 cases	 to	 autonomous	 institutional	 bodies.	 EU	
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institutions	will	 therefore	have	 to	make	do	with	 the	EU’s	 current	political	 safeguards.	This	
contribution	 distinguishes	 such	 political	 safeguards	 according	 to	 two	 main	 mechanisms	
through	 which	 they	 seek	 to	 influence	 the	 behaviour	 of	 target	 governments:	 material	
sanctions	and	social	 influence	 (Sedelmeier	2014:	113-14).	 It	argues	 that	material	 sanctions	
are	 difficult	 to	 use,	 due	 to	 a	 combination	 of	 voting	 rules,	member	 state	 preferences	 and	









backsliding.	 The	 case	 of	 the	 acquiescence	 of	 the	 Ponta	 government	 in	 Romania	 in	 2012	
demonstrates	that	under	–	admittedly	demanding	–	conditions,	EU	influence	is	possible	even	
without	material	sanctions.	Social	pressure	through	the	EU’s	existing	 instruments	might	be	
able	 to	achieve	 the	desired	results	of	domestic	change,	especially	 if	 they	are	adjusted	and	
applied	 in	such	a	way	as	 to	maximise	 their	 legitimacy.	Especially	 the	Commission’s	Rule	of	
Law	Framework	has	potential	because	 it	meets	 the	criteria	of	 formalisation,	publicity,	 and	
impartiality.	 Yet	 to	 increase	 the	 likelihood	 of	 influence,	 it	 needs	 to	 be	 applied	 more	
consistently	 and	 should	 be	 embedded	 in	 a	 process	 of	 regular	 monitoring	 through	 a	
democracy	scoreboard	covering	all	member	states.	
The	 next	 section	 discusses	 the	 EU’s	 main	 instrument	 through	 which	 it	 can	 wield	
material	 sanctions.	 It	 first	 analyses	 the	 obstacles	 for	 using	 this	 specific	 instrument,	 and	
second,	drawing	on	 the	 literature	on	EU	accession	conditionality,	 it	points	out	 the	general	
limits	of	reining	in	backsliding	through	material	sanctions.	The	subsequent	section	assesses	
the	 scope	 of	 novel	 EU	 instruments	 to	 address	 democratic	 backsliding	 through	 social	
influence.	It	draws	on	the	literature	on	international	socialisation	and	on	the	EU’s	previous	
experience	of	using	social	pressure	to	identify	conditions	under	which	these	instruments	can	






allows	 the	 European	 Council	 to	 suspend	 ‘certain	 [membership]	 rights’	 of	 a	member	 state	
that	commits	a	‘serious	and	persistent	breach’	of	the	liberal	democratic	values	contained	in	
Article	 2	 TEU.	 Article	 7	 explicitly	 mentions	 that	 these	 rights	 include	 voting	 rights	 in	 the	
Council,	 but	 clearly	 other,	 and	 potentially	 even	 stronger	 (or	 weaker)	 sanctions	 (such	 as	
withholding	 funding	 from	 the	 EU	 budget)	 are	 possible.	 In	 principle,	 the	 EU	 therefore	 has	
significant	 sanctioning	 power,	 but	 Article	 7	 specifically,	 and	 material	 sanctions	 more	
generally,	 have	 limits	 as	 an	 instrument	 to	 rein	 in	 breaches	 of	 liberal	 democracy	 in	 the	
member	 states.	 First,	 a	 combination	of	 voting	 rules,	member	 state	preferences,	 and	party	
politics	make	it	difficult	to	use	Article	7.	Second,	even	if	it	was	easier	to	use	it,	insights	from	






Amsterdam	 in	 1997.	 Although	 the	 (then)	member	 states	 agreed	 on	 sanctions	 against	 the	
Austrian	 government	 after	 the	 Austrian	 People’s	 Party	 (ÖVP)	 formed	 a	 coalition	with	 the	





the	 European	 Council.	 The	 obstacles	 to	 using	 Article	 7,	 and	 thus	 to	 threaten	 material	
sanctions	credibly,	result	from	a	combination	of	voting	rules,	member	state	preferences,	and	
party	politics.		









decision,	 rather	 than	 the	 subsequent	 decision	 about	 sanctions,	 that	 requires	 extremely	
demanding	 majorities:	 unanimity	 (minus	 one)	 in	 the	 European	 Council	 and	 a	 two-thirds	
majority	in	the	EP.	These	high	voting	thresholds	also	appear	to	deter	even	mere	proposals	to	
use	Article	7:	potential	supporters	are	reluctant	to	submit	a	formal	proposal	for	fear	that	a	
defeat	 will	 be	 interpreted	 as	 establishing	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 breach,	 rather	 than	 simply	 a	
shortfall	of	the	required	political	support.	For	example,	in	October	2015	the	centre-left	S&D	




Member	 state	 preferences	 are	 another	 obstacle	 to	 using	 Article	 7.	 Both	 these	
demanding	 voting	 rules	 and	 the	 general	 determination	 of	 the	 member	 states	 in	 the	
negotiations	 of	 the	 Amsterdam	 Treaty	 to	 maintain	 full	 control	 over	 the	 use	 of	 Article	 7	
reflect	 a	 strong	underlying	 aversion	 to	 using	 sanctions.	 These	unfavourable	member	 state	
preferences	stem	partly	from	concerns	about	national	sovereignty,	especially	among	the	less	
integration-minded	governments.	Partly	they	reflect	more	general	concerns	about	isolating	
individual	 member	 states,	 and	 that	 alienating	 a	 government	 through	 applying	 sanctions	
would	 be	 detrimental	 to	 cooperative	 decision-making	 in	 the	 EU.	 Apart	 from	 a	 general	

















(Sedelmeier	 2014:	 108-113;	 Sedelmeier	 2016).	 Of	 course	 the	 findings	 about	 EP	 group	
positions	 do	 not	 necessarily	 apply	 to	 the	 member	 state	 governments	 in	 the	 Council.	
Nonetheless,	the	requirement	of	the	EP’s	assent	in	Article	7(2)	TEU	means	that	party	politics	




At	 the	 same	 time,	 these	 partisan	 dynamics	 also	 suggest	 that	 certain	 constellations	







case	 for	 the	 Greens	 and	 Social	 Democrats	 with	 regard	 to	 Victor	 Ponta’s	 centre-left	
government	 in	Romania	 in	2012	(on	which	 I	will	elaborate	 further	below).	Second,	 illiberal	
governments	 composed	 of	 national	 conservative	 parties	 or	 populist	 radical	 right	 parties	
might	 face	 support	 for	 sanctions	 not	 only	 from	 the	 centre-left,	 but	 also	 from	 the	 centre-
right.	Even	if	such	governments	are	not	equally	ideologically	(Left/Right)	distant	as	parties	of	
the	Left,	parties	 in	 the	EPP	might	 consider	 them	 ideological	 rivals,	 if	 they	are	members	of	
other	 political	 groups:	 PiS	 in	 Poland	 is	 a	 member	 of	 the	 European	 Conservatives	 and	
Reformists	 (ECR)	 group,	while	 its	main	 domestic	 rival,	 the	 centre-right	 Civic	 Platform,	 is	 a	
member	of	the	EPP.	And	indeed,	the	EPP	supported	the	EP	resolution	of	13	April	2016	that	
expressed	its	concerns	about	democracy	and	the	rule	of	law	in	Poland.		
Yet	 these	 caveats	 notwithstanding,	 the	 key	 point	 remains	 that	 party	 politics,	 in	
addition	to	more	traditional	concerns	about	national	sovereignty	in	the	member	states,	and	
to	 the	very	demanding	majority	 requirements	 in	 the	EP	and	 the	European	Council,	 greatly	
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2004;	 Schimmelfennig	 and	 Sedelmeier	 2004;	 Sedelmeier	 2011;	 Vachudova	 2005).	 Yet	 this	
literature	also	suggests	that	material	 incentives	are	insufficient	when	used	towards	illiberal	
governments	 (Schimmelfennig	 and	 Sedelmeier	 2005b:	 213-14;	 Schimmelfennig	 2005).	 In	
cases	 like	 Slovakia	 under	 Vladimír	Mečiar	 or	 Croatia	 under	 Franjo	 Tuđman,	 EU	 incentives	









These	 findings	 of	 the	 literature	 on	 pre-accession	 conditionality	 imply	 that	 the	
capacity	 of	 material	 sanctions	 to	 reverse	 democratic	 backsliding	 is	 limited.	 If	 illiberal	









Yet	 even	widespread	 voter	 dissatisfaction	 about	 losing	membership	 benefits	might	
not	 endanger	 a	 government’s	 grip	 on	office.	 Illiberal	 practices	 precisely	make	 it	 easier	 for	
governments	to	withstand	a	possible	backlash	from	voters.	Moreover,	sanctions	that	impose	
material	costs	on	the	country	by	withdrawing	the	benefits	of	membership	might	not	simply	
mobilise	 societal	 groups	 that	 lose	 out	 against	 the	 government.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 as	 also	
suggested	 by	 Schlipphak	 and	 Treib	 (2016),	 governments	 can	 use	 outside	 interventions	
through	 EU	 sanctions	 to	mobilise	 domestic	 support.	 External	 threats	 can	 have	 a	 ‘rallying-
round-the-flag	effect’	as	domestic	groups	back	the	government	in	order	to	avoid	appearing	
disloyal	 (Galtung	 1967).	 Moreover,	 governments	 can	 blame	 external	 sanctions	 for	 any	
hardship	that	voters	experience	and	avoid	scrutiny	for	failings	of	their	own	socio-economic	
policies.		






ended	 nature	 of	 sanctions	 that	 could	 then	 be	 adopted	 under	 Article	 7(3)	with	 a	 qualified	
majority.	Any	attempt	to	give	Article	7	TEU	some	more	bite,	therefore,	would	need	to	make	
it	possible	to	use	it	more	narrowly,	to	vote	on	clearly	defined	sanctions	for	specific	illiberal	















2001,	 Risse	 2000)	 and	 social	 pressure	 (Johnston	 2001).	 A	 longstanding	 instrument	 are	
resolutions	and	own	 initiative	 reports	by	 the	EP.	By	exposing	and	criticising	member	 state	
practices	that	breach	 liberal	democratic	principles,	the	main	mechanism	is	shaming.	 In	this	
section,	 I	 will	 focus	 on	 new	 instruments	 that	 EU	 institutions	 have	 developed	 to	 address	
democratic	 backsliding	 in	member	 states.	 The	 emphasis	 on	 dialogue	 in	 the	 Commission’s	
‘rule	of	law	framework’	marks	it	as	an	instrument	based	on	persuasion,	but	the	publicity	of	
the	 process	 also	 entails	 a	 strong	 element	 of	 social	 pressure.	 The	 Council’s	 ‘rule	 of	 law	
dialogue’	 emphasises	 arguing	 and	 persuasion	 over	 the	 possibility	 of	 shaming	 individual	
member	states.	
To	 scrutinise	 the	 capacity	 of	 these	 new	 instruments	 to	 redress	 democratic	
backsliding,	this	section	first	establishes	more	clearly	under	what	conditions	social	pressure	
is	 most	 likely	 to	 be	 successful.	 To	 identify	 these	 conditions,	 I	 draw	 on	 the	 EU’s	 previous	
experience	 in	 using	 social	 pressure,	 and	 on	 the	 broader	 literature	 on	 international	
socialisation	 and	 the	 domestic	 impact	 of	 international	 institutions.	 I	 then	 discuss	 the	




that	 it	 is	 indeed	 possible	 to	 exert	 influence	 without	 material	 leverage.	 The	 Romanian	
government,	led	by	Victor	Ponta’s	Social	Democratic	Party	(SDL)	committed	various	breaches	
of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 in	 attempting	 to	 impeach	 their	 party-political	 rival,	 the	 centre-right	





therefore	 largely	 successful	 in	 pressing	 the	 government	 to	 reverse	 its	measures	 (see	 also	
Isumen	2015;	Pop-Eleches	2013).	
The	 EU’s	 influence	 on	 the	 Ponta	 government	 relied	 heavily	 on	 social	 pressure,	 for	






leverage	 was	 not	 completely	 absent.	 In	 contrast	 to	 the	 Hungarian	 case	 in	 which	 the	 EPP	
clearly	stated	 its	defence	of	 the	Fidesz	government,	 the	potential	 threat	of	Article	7	might	
have	found	much	less	opposition	in	the	case	of	the	Romanian	government.	Second,	domestic	
conditions	 for	 social	 influence	 (Checkel	 2001;	 Johnston	 2001;	 Schimmelfennig	 and	
Sedelmeier	 2005a:18-20)	 were	 particularly	 conducive	 in	 Romania.	 The	 EU	 enjoys	 a	 high	
legitimacy	both	with	the	broader	public	and	the	main	political	parties,	including	Ponta’s	SDL.	
This	 strong	 legitimacy	 made	 the	 Romanian	 government	 more	 susceptible	 to	 shaming	
through	 the	 EU’s	 interventions	 (not	 least	 since	 the	 then	 39-year	 old	 Ponta	was	 a	 relative	
novice	to	international	diplomacy,	which	may	have	made	him	more	open	to	persuasion).		
The	 Romanian	 case	 thus	 demonstrates	 that	 it	 is	 possible	 for	 the	 EU	 to	 induce	
member	 state	 governments	 to	 reverse	breaches	of	 liberal	 democracy	without	 threatening	
material	 sanctions.	 Admittedly,	 the	 conditions	 in	 this	 particular	 case	 were	 exceptionally	
conducive	 to	 social	 influence.	 But	 it	 certainly	 cautions	 against	 dismissing	 toothless	
mechanisms	 of	 social	 influence	 and	 persuasion	 too	 quickly	 as	 inevitably	 ineffective.	
Moreover,	 the	 Romanian	 case	 demonstrates	 that	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	 pessimistic	 view	 of	
Schlipphak	 and	 Treib	 (2016)	 interventions	 by	 existing	 EU	 institutions	may	 be	 perceived	 as	
legitimate	and	do	not	necessarily	create	a	domestic	backslash.	Crucially,	this	 is	much	more	
likely	if	EU	interventions	entail	social	pressure	rather	than	material	sanctions.		
To	 increase	 the	 likelihood	 of	 success	 of	 social	 pressure,	 we	 can	 derive	 from	 the	
literature	–	in	addition	to	domestic	conditions	mentioned	above	–	also	certain	principles	for	
how	 it	 should	 be	 applied.	 In	 brief,	 the	 influence	 of	 international	 demands	 and	 criticism	
depends	 on	 their	 legitimacy,	 which	 in	 turn	 is	 determined	 by	 specific	 conditions	 (Checkel	




moreover,	 social	pressure	 requires	publicity	and	 transparency	while	a	depoliticised	 setting	
and	 a	 deliberative	 quality	 of	 interactions	 with	 the	 target	 government	 are	 necessary	 for	
persuasion.	 The	 following	 sub-sections	 assess	 to	 what	 extent	 the	 instruments	 that	 the	




confront	systematic	 threats	 to	 liberal	democracy	 in	 the	member	states	 (Commission	2014;	
see	 also	 Kochenov	 and	 Pech	 2015).	 This	 framework	 creates	 a	 more	 formal	 procedure	






problems	 and	 specifies	 a	 deadline	 for	 the	member	 state	 to	 do	 so.	 In	 the	 third	 stage,	 the	
Commission	monitors	the	member	state’s	implementation	of	its	recommendation,	and	if	it	is	
not	satisfied,	it	can	propose	using	Article	7.	
The	 process	 thus	 primarily	 establishes	 a	 more	 formal	 and	 structured	 dialogue	
between	 the	 Commission	 and	 the	 member	 state	 concerned	 in	 order	 to	 solve	 the	 issue	
without	 recourse	 to	Article	 7.	 But	 since	 the	Commission	 can	ultimately	 still	 only	 resort	 to	
proposing	the	use	of	Article	7	 if	the	process	fails,	 it	considers	the	rule	of	 law	mechanism	a	
‘pre-Article	 7’	 procedure.	 It	 therefore	 also	 insists	 that	 the	new	process	 does	not	 establish	
new	powers	for	the	Commission	and	that	it	is	complementary	to	existing	procedures.	In	fact,	
to	a	certain	extent	 the	procedure	codifies	earlier	 informal	practice	of	 the	Commission	and	
sets	 it	within	a	more	structured	framework.	As	discussed	above,	 in	the	case	of	Romania	 in	
2012,	Commission	President	Barroso	presented	Prime	Minister	Ponta	with	a	list	of	11	points	
to	 be	 addressed	 in	 order	 to	 solve	 the	 constitutional	 crisis,	 which	 is	 reminiscent	 of	 the	
suggested	 ‘rule	 of	 law	 recommendation’.	 Moreover,	 the	 different	 stages	 in	 the	 process	









In	view	of	 the	conditions	 for	effective	social	pressure,	 the	 rule	of	 law	 framework	 is	
certainly	a	promising	innovation.	First,	a	more	formal	and	structured	procedure	should	enjoy	
greater	 legitimacy	 than	 informal	 practice.	 Second,	 the	 framework	 generates	 the	




are	 required,	 since	 they	 are	more	 conducive	 to	 persuasion	 and	 allow	 the	 government	 to	
back	down	without	losing	face	domestically.	When	the	target	government	is	Eurosceptic	(as	
in	 the	case	of	Fidesz	or	PiS),	but	 the	EU	enjoys	significant	support	among	the	public	 (as	 in	
Poland),	 greater	 publicity	 and	 a	 more	 transparent	 process	 that	 explicitly	 specifies	 the	
concerns	 of	 EU	 institutions	 is	 more	 promising	 as	 it	 provides	 additional	 legitimacy	 to	 the	
arguments	 of	 the	 domestic	 opposition.	 Third,	 since	 the	 Commission	 is	 an	 independent,	
supranational	 institution,	 the	 framework	 also	 meets	 the	 criterion	 of	 impartiality.	 The	
legitimacy	of	the	process	therefore	might	not	even	require	creating	a	new	body	for	this	task	
or	 outsourcing	 it	 to	 external	 bodies,	 especially	 if	 the	 Commission’s	 assessment	 draws	
transparently	 on	 external	 sources,	 such	 as	 Opinions	 of	 the	 Council	 of	 Europe’s	 Venice	
Commission	or	of	independent	legal	expert	bodies.	To	avoid	accusations	of	partisanship,	the	
Commissioner	 of	 the	 country	 in	 question	 could	 abstain	 from	 votes	 in	 the	 college.	 Donald	
Tusk’s	 criticism	of	using	 the	 framework	against	Poland	 (Financial	Times,	 18.01.2016)	 could	
be	 interpreted	precisely	as	an	attempt	 to	avoid	accusations	of	 instrumentalising	 the	EU	to	
discredit	domestic	party	political	rivals.	
At	 the	 same	 time,	 changes	 in	 application	 of	 the	 framework	 are	 necessary.	 The	
Commission	might	find	it	politically	expedient	to	fudge	or	dodge	cases	that	it	fears	it	cannot	
win	 (Batory	 2016),	 but	 this	 undermines	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 EU’s	 interventions.	
Argumentative	 consistency	 requires	 the	 Commission	 to	 go	 after	 all	 cases	 equally.	 In	 this	
12 
 







Independently	 of	 the	 Rule	 of	 Law	 Framework,	 the	 Commission	 also	 developed	 a	 tool	 to	
monitor	the	effectiveness	of	national	justice	systems,	the	‘EU	Justice	Scoreboard’,	published	
annually	 since	 March	 2013.	 The	 Scoreboard	 presents	 data	 on	 the	 efficiency	 of	 national	
courts	 according	 to	 specific	 comparative	 indicators	 (such	 as	 the	 length	 of	 judicial	




the	 Scoreboard’s	 assessments.	 This	 narrow	 focus	 fits	 the	 Commission’s	 rationale	 for	 the	
Scoreboard:	 highlighting	 the	 importance	 of	 functioning	 national	 justice	 systems	 for	
economic	growth	and	the	operation	of	 the	Single	Market	 (Commission	2013:	1-2).	But	 the	
Scoreboard	 is	 therefore	more	 suitable	 as	 an	 instrument	 to	 guide	 reforms	 to	 improve	 the	
efficiency	 of	 national	 justice	 systems,	 rather	 than	 for	 assessing	 their	 role	 in	 guaranteeing	
checks	and	balances	and	thus	as	a	tool	to	identify	threats	to	liberal	democracy.		
The	 Scoreboard	 in	 its	 current	 form	 is	 therefore	 a	 missed	 opportunity	 for	 a	 more	





might	 also	 be	 used	 for	 a	 ‘rule	 of	 law	 ranking’	 of	 EU	 countries.	 Regular	 monitoring	 of	 all	
member	states	would	 increase	the	 legitimacy	of	social	pressure	by	avoiding	accusations	of	
focusing	 selectively	 on	 individual	 member	 states.	 It	 would	 also	 allow	 the	 Commission	 to	
comment	 regularly	 on	measures	 that	 are	 problematic	 –	 even	 if	 the	 situation	 has	 not	 yet	
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reached	 the	 level	 of	 a	 ‘systemic	 breach’	 and	 provide	 domestic	 actors	 with	 ideational	
leverage	 to	 fight	 against	 such	 measures.	 Regularly	 commenting	 on	 any	 problematic	
measures	in	all	member	states	would	also	improve	argumentative	consistency	and	pre-empt	
attempts	by	illiberal	governments	to	justify	their	own	measures	with	reference	to	practices	
elsewhere	 that	 had	not	 been	denounced	 equally.	 Finally,	 regular	monitoring	 also	 helps	 to	
operationalise	 the	 principles	 of	 Article	 2	 (see	 also	 Blauberger	 and	 Kelemen	 2016),	 and	
rendering	 them	more	determinate	 increases	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 claims	 that	 they	 have	been	
breached.	
The	Council’s	Rule	of	Law	Dialogue	
In	 contrast	 to	 the	 potential	 for	 effective	 social	 pressure	 of	 the	 Commission’s	 new	
instruments	 (especially	 if	 adapted	 appropriately),	 the	 Council’s	 new	 instrument	 to	 protect	
the	 rule	 of	 law	 in	 the	member	 states	 is	 far	more	 limited.	 In	 December	 2014,	 the	 Council	
agreed	to	establish	an	annual	‘dialogue	…	to	promote	and	safeguard	the	rule	of	law’	among	
the	member	states	within	the	General	Affairs	Council	(Council	2014:	20-21).	Key	principles	of	
the	 dialogue	 are	 that	 it	 should	 be	 ‘conducted	 on	 a	 non	 partisan	 and	 evidence-based	
approach’	according	to	‘the	principle	of	sincere	cooperation’;	and	that	it	should	‘respect	the	
national	 identities	 of	Member	 States’	 (which	may	 be	 Council-speak	 to	 legitimise	 different	
governments’	interpretation	of	democracy).	Arguably	these	principles	reflect	the	concern	of	
some	member	states	that	the	dialogue	should	not	be	used	to	discuss,	and	potentially	shame,	
specific	 member	 states.	 Instead	 of	 focusing	 on	 countries,	 the	 Council	 ‘will	 consider,	 as	
needed,	to	launch	debates	on	thematic	subject	matters’	(2014:	21).	
The	early	practice	of	the	Council	Dialogue	suggests	an	aversion	to	discussing	precisely	
the	 most	 salient	 challenges	 to	 liberal	 democracy	 among	 its	 members.	 The	 first	 Council	
Dialogue	on	18	November	2015	focused	primarily	on	the	balance	between	counter-terrorism	




to	 steer	 clear	 of	 discussing	 e.g.	 the	 political	 situation	 in	 Hungary,	 or	 more	 generally	 the	




the	 view	 that	 the	 Dialogue	 was	 either	 primarily	 created	 as	 an	 attempt	 to	 ‘kill	 off’	 the	
Commission’s	rule	of	 law	framework	and	to	pre-empt	 its	activation,	or	that	 it	presents	the	
lowest	 common-denominator	 compromise	 acceptable	 to	 the	 Hungarian	 government	
(Kochenov	and	Pech	2015:	534;	536).		





This	 contribution	 has	 suggested	 that	 since	 the	 political	 feasibility	 of	 treaty	 changes	 to	
judicialise	the	EU’s	tools	against	democratic	backsliding	is	 limited	(Blauberger	and	Kelemen	
2016),	 the	 EU	will	 have	 to	 rely	 on	 political	 safeguards,	 such	 as	 Article	 7	 TEU	 and	modest	
institutional	 innovations	 like	 the	 Commission’s	 ‘rule	 of	 law	 mechanism’.	 Moreover,	 the	
effectiveness	of	 the	material	 sanctions	 is	 limited,	partly	because	 it	 is	extremely	difficult	 to	
use	 Article	 7	 TEU,	 partly	 because	 even	 a	 credible	 threat	 of	 severe	 material	 sanctions	 is	
unlikely	to	bring	illiberal	governments	to	renounce	the	very	practices	on	which	they	rely	to	
maintain	 office.	 A	 change	 to	Article	 7	 to	make	 a	more	 selective	 use	with	 clearly	 specified	
sanctions	possible	–	even	with	a	higher	voting	threshold	–	could	make	material	sanctions	a	




case	 of	 Romania	 in	 2012	 demonstrates	 that	 under	 certain	 –	 admittedly	 demanding	 –	
conditions	in	a	target	country,	social	pressure	can	lead	the	government	to	redress	breaches	
of	 liberal	 democratic	 principles.	 These	 conditions	 are	manifestly	 absent	 in	 the	 case	of	 the	




social	 influence	more	 effectively.	 The	 Council	 Dialogue	 is	 too	 averse	 to	 discussing	 specific	
member	 states	 to	 provide	 a	 forum	 for	 tackling	 backsliding	 through	 persuasion	 or	 social	
15 
 
pressure.	 Yet	 it	might	play	 an	 (albeit	more	 limited)	 role	 in	 establishing	 a	 consensus	 about	
good	practice	on	key	 issues	before	they	become	contested.	The	Commission’s	Rule	of	Law	
Framework	 meets	 key	 criteria	 for	 effective	 social	 pressure,	 such	 as	 a	 formal	 process,	
impartiality	 and	 publicity,	 but	 it	 needs	 to	 be	 applied	 more	 consistently	 to	 enhance	 its	
legitimacy	 on	 which	 it	 relies	 for	 its	 influence.	 The	 Commission’s	 Justice	 Scoreboard	 in	 its	
current	form	is	too	narrowly	focused	on	the	efficiency	of	national	court	systems.	A	broader	
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